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INTRODUCTION
Many states1

have begun formally to recognize coercive control2 as a form
of domestic violence in several contexts: criminal domestic violence cases,3
civil motions for protection from abuse,4 and child removal proceedings.5
This Essay argues, however, that while new laws recognizing coercive
control may be noble and well-meaning, they are unlikely to increase support
for mothers who have been victims of coercive control abuse and now seek
custody of their children. In fact, this Essay argues, the codification of these
laws may do more harm than good; by taking power away from men—and
coercive control is practiced almost exclusively by men6—and giving it to
women in the form of an additional tool in the fight-for-custody toolbox, men
may retaliate against victims in even more threatening ways.
Given the tendency of the court system to lag behind social constructs and
understandings, however, family courts are just beginning officially to
consider coercive control as domestic violence in custody determinations.7
Although the perception is outdated, “domestic violence” to many laypeople
equates to physical abuse. For at least three decades,8 however, experts have

1. Interestingly, without any announcement, the Trump administration changed the
federal definition of domestic violence in April 2019 to include only “felony or misdemeanor
crimes of violence.” Domestic Violence, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/
ovw/domestic-violence [https://perma.cc/DB4X-DPLA] (last visited Apr. 2, 2022). Under the
Obama administration, domestic violence was defined as
a pattern of abusive behavior in any relationship that is used by one partner to gain
or maintain power and control over another intimate partner. Domestic violence can
be physical, sexual, emotional, economic, or psychological actions or threats of
actions that influence another person. This includes any behaviors that intimidate,
manipulate, humiliate, isolate, frighten, terrorize, coerce, threaten, blame, hurt,
injure, or wound someone.
Domestic Violence, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://web.archive.org/web/20180409111243/
https:/www.justice.gov/ovw/domestic-violence.
As of January 2022, the Biden
administration has not changed the definition established in 2019.
2. See generally EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN
PERSONAL LIFE (2007).
3. See, e.g., Rampony v. Rizzo, No. B299147, 2020 WL 5105814, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug. 31, 2020); People v. Byrd, 51 A.D.3d 267, 271 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
4. See, e.g., G.I. v. J.S., No. CK16-03072, 2017 WL 4792366, at *5 (Del. Fam. Ct. May
18, 2017) (“[Father] committed abuse because the evidence indicates [father] injured [mother]
and engaged in course of alarming and distressing conduct that caused [mother] considerable
emotional distress.”); C.C. v. I.C., No. A-0771-19, 2021 WL 978521, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Mar. 16, 2021). But cf. In re Marriage of L.R. & K.A., 281 Cal. Rptr. 3d 706, 725
(Ct. App. 2021) (noting statutory requirement for “objective unreasonableness” in the conduct
alleged to be coercive control).
5. See, e.g., In re Omar I., 231 A.3d 1196, 1203 (Conn. App. 2020); In re Joseph L., 939
A.2d 16, 24 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008); N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. I.H.C., 2 A.3d 1138,
1157 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).
6. See generally STARK, supra note 2.
7. See infra notes 48–58.
8. See, e.g., Olivia A. Hess, Ready to Bridge the Disconnect: Implementing England and
Wales’ Coercive Control Model for Criminalizing Domestic Abuse in the United States, 30
IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 383, 393 (2020).
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understood that domestic violence takes many forms, including emotional,9
psychological,10 and financial abuse.11
Coercive control, which
encompasses all of these types of domestic violence, has been recognized as
a concomitant form of abuse that usually accompanies the other, more
concrete forms.12
For the purposes of this Symposium, the codification of coercive control
is most relevant in the context of child custody disputes that often arise in
high-conflict divorce situations. Factors that courts use to determine child
custody arrangements differ from state to state; most states establish these
factors through statutory schemes but leave the weighing of the factors to the
discretion of family court judges. While in many states no one factor is
dispositive, many state statutes establish a rebuttable presumption13 against
awarding perpetrators of domestic violence14 custody of minor children.
Others require a judge to consider domestic violence as a factor in deciding
child custody disputes.15 That violence may be perpetrated by a parent
against a parent or by a parent against a child; the underlying policy
consideration is that, in considering the best interests of the child, safety and
security are baseline and fundamental concerns.16

9. See, e.g., Michelle Bemiller, When Battered Mothers Lose Custody: A Qualitative
Study of Abuse at Home and in the Courts, 5 J. CHILD CUSTODY 228, 229 (2008).
10. See, e.g., Michelle L. Toews & Autumn M. Bermea, “I Was Naive in Thinking, ‘I
Divorced This Man, He Is Out of My Life’”: A Qualitative Exploration of Post-Separation
Power and Control Tactics Experienced by Women, 32 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 2166,
2169 (2017).
11. See, e.g., April M. Zeoli et al., Post-Separation Abuse of Women and Their Children:
Boundary-Setting and Family Court Utilization Among Victimized Mothers, 28 J. FAM.
VIOLENCE 547, 554 (2013).
12. See, e.g., Lesley Laing, Secondary Victimization: Domestic Violence Survivors
Navigating the Family Law System, 23 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1314, 1315 (2017).
13. See infra note 48.
14. This term is defined quite differently in different jurisdictions. For example, in
Florida, a person is only a perpetrator of domestic violence if the person has been convicted
of the crime. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(c)(2) (West 2022) (“The court shall order that the
parental responsibility for a minor child be shared by both parents unless the court finds that
shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child. The following evidence [inter
alia] creates a rebuttable presumption of detriment to the child: A parent has been convicted
of a misdemeanor of the first degree or higher involving domestic violence . . . .”). Other
states merely require proof of domestic violence by a preponderance of the evidence or clear
and convincing evidence. See infra note 55 and accompanying text. Some states require that
the victim prove a “pattern” of abuse. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101 (2022); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004 (West 2022); WIS. STAT. § 767.41 (2022). Idaho requires that the
abuser be a “habitual perpetrator.” IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717B (West 2022).
15. See infra notes 48.
16. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.03(B) (2022) (“The court shall consider the
safety and well-being of the child and of the victim of the act of domestic violence to be of
primary importance.”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1653(1)(B) (West 2022) (“[D]omestic
abuse is a serious crime against the individual and society, producing an unhealthy and
dangerous family environment, resulting in a pattern of escalating abuse, including
violence . . . .”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-2921 (West 2022) (“[T]he safety and welfare of
the child is paramount in the resolution of those conflicts.”); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 15-5-16(G)(2) (West 2022) (“[T]he court shall consider as primary the safety and well-being
of the child and of the parent who is the victim of domestic or family violence.”).
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Family courts, therefore, could play an important role in recognizing
coercive control as a scientifically recognized form of domestic abuse and in
taking steps to protect victims and their children through custody
determinations. This Essay argues, however, that coercive control laws,
while well-intentioned, progressive, and likely to serve an important
expressive function,17 will almost certainly fail to help women who seek to
obtain custody of their children, given the current political climate around
accusations of domestic abuse. In fact, women who raise coercive control in
custody cases may place themselves and their children in further jeopardy.
At issue is how family courts might effectively recognize and analyze the
coercive control behaviors of parents seeking custody in a way that is fair,
objective, and grounded in social science. Given gender dynamics, the
interplay between domestic violence and sustained litigation, and the heavy
responsibility and complexity of the task of identifying coercive control,
courts will undoubtedly encounter substantial difficulties in applying new
domestic violence definitions to real families.
I. WHAT IS COERCIVE CONTROL?
Coercive control, sometimes called “psychological abuse” or “emotional
abuse,” is universally recognized among experts in the field as a form of
domestic violence.18 Evan Stark, the prevailing expert in the area of coercive
control, explains, “Coercive control entails a malevolent course of conduct
that subordinates women to an alien will by violating their physical integrity
(domestic violence), denying them respect and autonomy (intimidation),
depriving them of social connectedness (isolation), and appropriating or
denying them access to the resources required for personhood and citizenship
(control).”19 Indeed, because coercive control is “a factual description of
conduct . . . not a term of art for which an objective legal definition exists,”20
courts usually rely on experts to help them recognize coercive control
behaviors and patterns. One anti–domestic violence organization has stated:
Coercive control entails power and control over the victim through actions
such as isolation, humiliation, intimidation, and domination. It does not
relate to a single incident but is a purposeful pattern of behavior that takes
place over a period of time in order to make the victim dependent on the
abuser. An abuser may exert coercive control by isolating the victim from
family or friends, hiding family assets, restricting access to money or
providing an “allowance”, damaging the victim’s property, or threatening
17. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Renewing the Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence: An
Assessment Three Years Later, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 613, 621 (2007) (arguing that
criminalizing domestic violence has an important expressive purpose); see also Alafair S.
Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent:
An Alternative
Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 552, 598 (2007) (arguing that “specialized
domestic violence statute[s] [possess] expressive importance [in communicating] . . . the
message that domestic violence is a pattern of conduct defined by the intent to gain power and
control”).
18. See, e.g., STARK, supra note 2, at 5–6; Linn v. State, 929 N.W.2d 717 (Iowa 2019).
19. STARK, supra note 2, at 15.
20. In re Omar I., 231 A.3d 1196, 1244 (Conn. App. 2020).
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to harm the victim’s children or pets. These are all acts of coercive control
that leave victims scared and trapped and are the very behaviors from which
our laws must be designed to protect.21

Importantly, because coercive control is a pattern of behavior rising to the
level of abuse, it is not just “nagging”;22 rather, as one court put it, “coercive
control is based upon a ‘systematic, repetitive infliction of psychological
trauma’ designed to ‘instill terror and helplessness.’”23 Moreover, even
though
many parts of a pattern of coercive control don’t always arise to the level
of arrestable offense, but could be part of terrorizing somebody, making
them scared . . . a lack of recent arrests does not mean there is no coercive
control. “It’s a common mistake for people to assume that if there’s no
evident physical violence that somebody isn’t able to . . . terrorize and
control somebody.”24

As one court quoted an expert, “[the domestic violence] isn’t necessarily
physical but may be more dangerous because it’s emotional and much harder
to detect.”25
Complicating the application of any accepted definition of coercive control
is the tendency of both abusers and their victims to minimize the toxic,
abusive relationship dynamic. Perpetrators of coercive control typically
argue that they are not abusers if they do not inflict physical harm;26
moreover, because one component of coercive control is the intentional
diminishing of self-worth, victims may not recognize themselves as victims
absent physical abuse.27
II. RECENT LEGAL RECOGNITION OF COERCIVE CONTROL
Although the perpetrators and victims may not recognize nonphysical
abuse as a form of abuse, over the past decade, multiple countries—including

21. Press Release, Connecticut Coal. Against Domestic Violence, New Connecticut
Restraining Order Law Goes into Effect 10/1 (Sept. 29, 2021), http://www.ctcadv.org/
files/2116/3291/9013/RELEASE_PA21-78_ROeffective9.29.21.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZELVEFT].
22. See generally Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and
Reclaiming Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107 (2009).
23. G.I. v. J.S., No. CK16-03072, 2017 WL 4792366, at *5 (Del. Fam. Ct. May 18, 2017).
24. In re Joseph L., No. L15CP04007932A, 2006 WL 3008476, at *22 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Sept. 15, 2006).
25. G.I., 2017 WL 4792366, at *4 (alteration in original).
26. See, e.g., Floretta Boonzaier & Cheryl de la Rey, Woman Abuse: The Construction of
Gender in Women and Men’s Narratives of Violence, 34 S. AFR. J. PSYCHOLOGY 443, 449, 451
(2004); Emma Williamson, Living in the World of the Domestic Violence Perpetrator:
Negotiating the Unreality of Coercive Control, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1412, 1418
(2010).
27. See, e.g., Williamson, supra note 26, at 1415; Bonnie S. Fisher et al., Abuses Against
Older Women: Prevalence and Health Effects, 26 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 254, 264
(2011).
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Australia,28 Canada,29 France,30 Ireland,31 Scotland,32 the United
Kingdom,33 and Wales34—have paid attention to the experts and enacted
laws expanding the definition of domestic violence to include coercive
control. The United States has been slower to follow suit, but several states
have recently joined the trend of legally recognizing nonphysical forms of
abuse. Most recently, Arkansas,35 California,36 Connecticut,37 Hawaii,38 and
Mississippi39 have added coercive control to their statutory definitions of
domestic violence, and Illinois,40 Maryland,41 Massachusetts,42 Oklahoma,43
28. See Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas.) pt 2, s 9(1) (Austl.),
https://www.legislation.tas.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/act-2004-067#GS9@EN
[https://perma.cc/YJ43-5W9Y] (Tasmania only).
29. Domestic Violence Protection Act, S.O. 2000, c 33 (Can. Ont.),
https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/s00033 [https://perma.cc/CE42-UUE5].
30. See Code pénal [C. pén.] [Penal Code] art. 222-33-2-1 (Fr.).
31. See
Domestic
Violence
Act
2018
(Act
No.
6/2018)
(Ir.),
https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2018/act/6/section/39/enacted/en/html [https://perma.cc/
G6J5-3E6S].
32. See Domestic Abuse Act 2018, c. 5 (Scotland), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/
2018/5/contents [https://perma.cc/G46X-U2AX].
33. See Serious Crime Act 2015, c. 9, § 76 (UK), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
2015/9/part/5/crossheading/domestic-abuse#text%3D%22domestic%20abuse%22
[https://perma.cc/Z6XH-8FSH] (defining “domestic abuse”).
34. See Violence Against Women, Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence (Wales) Act
2015, c. 3 § 24(1) (UK), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/anaw/2015/3/contents [https://
perma.cc/5566-RC92].
35. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-219(b) (2022) (defining coercive control, called “course of
control” in the final law, and adding such control to the reasons a court could grant a protection
order ex parte).
36. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6320(a) (West 2022) (adding coercive control, defined as
“disturbing the peace of the other party,” as evidence of domestic violence in family court).
37. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-1(b) (West 2022) (adding coercive control to definition
of domestic violence).
38. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 586-1 (West 2022) (“‘Domestic abuse’ means: [p]hysical
harm, bodily injury, assault, or the threat of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault,
extreme psychological abuse, coercive control, or malicious property damage between family
or household members . . . .”).
39. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 93-21-125(1)(c) (2022) (“The term ‘domestic violence’ . . .
includes any pattern of behavior or coercive control resulting in physical, emotional or
psychological harm to a victim . . . .”).
40. See H.B. 3292, 102d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2021) (proposing to add “coercive
control” to meaning of abuse in domestic violence cases).
41. See S.B. 775, 102d Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2021) (proposing to create a rebuttable
presumption that it is not in the best interests of the child for a court to give sole or joint legal
or physical custody to a party who has committed abuse against certain people and defining
“primary aggressor,” in part, as looking at the history of domestic violence between the parties
and whether one party has exhibited coercive control toward the other party).
42. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 33(7) (2022) (noting that district attorneys, police
officers, and court personnel must be trained at least once biannually on domestic violence,
including “the dynamics of coercive controlling behavior that increases dangerousness even
when such patterns of behavior are not themselves violent”); H.B. 1643, 192d Gen. Ct. (Mass.
2021) (seeking to improve protections relative to domestic violence and adding coercive
control to the definition); S.B. 1112, 192d Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2021).
43. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 109(I) (West 2022) (noting the rebuttable presumption
that “sole custody, joint legal or physical custody, or any shared parenting plan with the
perpetrator of domestic violence, harassing or stalking behavior is detrimental and not in the
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Oregon,44 South Carolina,45 Tennessee,46 and Washington47 have attempted
to do so.
III. WHY COERCIVE CONTROL LAWS MAY OR MAY NOT MAKE A
DIFFERENCE IN CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES
In the family law context, the national trend toward defining coercive
control as a component of domestic violence is an important one because all
fifty states and Washington, D.C., statutorily require family court judges to
consider past or existing domestic violence in making child custody
determinations. A minority of states create a rebuttable presumption that
judges may not award joint custody in families in which domestic violence
has occurred.48 The majority of states, however, require judges to consider
domestic violence as a factor in their custody determinations,49 while a few
best interest of the child, and it is in the best interest of the child to reside with the parent who
is not a perpetrator of domestic violence, harassing or stalking behavior”); id. § 109(I)(2)(a)
(stating “domestic violence” means, [inter alia], . . . the intentional infliction of emotional
distress . . . including coercive control by a parent involving physical, sexual, psychological,
emotional, economic or financial abuse”).
44. H.B. 3186, 81st Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2021) (seeking to modify the Family
Abuse Prevention Act to include coercive control, add definitions of “coercive control,” and
add coercive control to meaning of abuse).
45. H.B. 5271, 123d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2020) (seeking to create an offense
of coercive control under domestic violence crimes).
46. H.B. 1320, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011) (seeking to modify the
definition of “family violence” to include “sexual, economic or emotional abuse, stalking, or
other forms of coercive control”); S.B. 1230, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011).
47. H.B. 1320, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021) (seeking to add coercive control to
definition of domestic violence and into crimes included in harassment); S.B. 5297, 67th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021).
48. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-131 (2022) (“In every proceeding where there is at issue
a dispute as to the custody of a child, a determination by the court that domestic or family
violence has occurred raises a rebuttable presumption by the court that it is detrimental to the
child and not in the best interest of the child to be placed in sole custody, joint legal custody,
or joint physical custody with the perpetrator of domestic or family violence.”); CAL. FAM.
CODE § 3044(a) (West 2022) (“[T]here is a rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or
joint physical or legal custody of a child to a person who has perpetrated domestic violence
[within the last five years] is detrimental to the best interest of the child . . . .”); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 32-717B(5) (West 2022) (“There shall be a presumption that joint custody is not in the
best interests of a minor child if one (1) of the parents is found by the court to be a habitual
perpetrator of domestic violence [requiring ‘physical injury, sexual abuse or forced
imprisonment or threat thereof’ as per IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6303(1)] . . . .”). Many other
states have similar statutory provisions.
49. One state uses “must” language in requiring family courts to consider domestic
violence as a factor in child custody determinations. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1)(a)
(McKinney 2022) (“Where either party to an action concerning custody of or a right to
visitation with a child alleges . . . that the other party has committed an act of domestic
violence . . . the court must consider the effect of such domestic violence upon the best
interests of the child . . . .”). Michigan’s statute states that “‘best interests of the child’ means
the sum total of the following factors to be considered, evaluated, and determined by the
court . . . [, including] [d]omestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed
against or witnessed by the child.” MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23(3)(k) (West 2022). But
this language has been interpreted in a long line of cases to mean that “[t]he trial court must
consider and explicitly state its findings and conclusions with regard to each factor.”
Thompson v. Thompson, 683 N.W.2d 250, 253 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). All other mandatory
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allow family court judges to exercise discretion in deciding whether to
consider domestic violence as a factor.50
Moreover, this trend toward a more complete understanding of domestic
violence and our evolving willingness to credit women’s accounts of
nonphysical abuse51 is critical to a broader, more mainstream view of the
harms of psychological abuse. As it has in many other areas of American
life, the law can play an important role in changing attitudes and behaviors.52
First, legally prohibiting or requiring behaviors can eventually lead to
substantial transformation in societal belief systems.53 Second, changing the
states use “shall” language. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8(7) (West 2022) (“[T]he
court shall consider all relevant factors, including . . . [e]vidence of a pattern of domestic or
family violence by either parent.” (emphasis added)); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-3203(a)(9)(A)–
(B) (West 2022) (“In determining the issue of legal custody, residency and parenting time of
a child, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to . . . evidence
of domestic abuse, including, but not limited to . . . [a] pattern or history of physically or
emotionally abusive behavior or threat thereof used by one person to gain or maintain
domination and control over an intimate partner or household member; or . . . an act of
domestic violence, stalking or sexual assault . . . .”).
50. A small minority of states grant discretion to family courts in deciding whether to
consider domestic violence as a factor in child custody determinations. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 46b-56(c)(15) (2022) (stating courts “may consider . . . the effect on the child of the actions
of an abuser, if any domestic violence . . . has occurred between the parents or between a
parent and another individual or the child”); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-3(a)(3)(P) (2022) (noting
that judges “may consider any relevant factor including, but not limited to: . . . [a]ny evidence
of family violence or sexual, mental, or physical child abuse or criminal history of either
parent”). Confusingly, Montana seems to combine standards. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 40-4-212(1)(f) (2022) (“The court shall consider all relevant parenting factors, which may
include but are not limited to . . . physical abuse or threat of physical abuse by one parent
against the other parent or the child.”). In July 2022, Washington State will change its
parenting plan statute to state: “The permanent parenting plan shall not require mutual
decision-making or designation of a dispute resolution process other than court action if it is
found that a parent has engaged in . . . (c) a history of acts of domestic violence . . . .” WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.191(1) (West 2022) (effective July 1, 2022). The statute will further
state that “[t]he parent’s residential time with the child shall be limited if it is found that the
parent has engaged in (iii) a history of acts of domestic violence . . . .” Id. § 26.09.191(2)(a)
(effective July 1, 2022). The new code will define domestic violence as, inter alia, “unlawful
harassment,” “stalking of one intimate partner by another intimate partner,” or “stalking of
one family or household member by another family or household member.” Id.
§ 7.105.010(8)(a)–(b) (effective July 1, 2022). West Virginia recently amended its code to
state that “[i]f either of the parents so requests, or upon receipt of credible information thereof,
the court shall determine whether a parent who would otherwise be allocated responsibility
under a parenting plan [inter alia] . . . [h]as committed domestic violence . . . .” W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 48-9-209(a) (West 2022). “If a parent is found to have engaged in any activity
specified by subsection (a) of this section, the court shall impose limits that are reasonably
calculated to protect the child or child’s parent from harm.” Id. § 48-9-209(b). “[T]he court
may not allocate custodial responsibility or decision-making responsibility to that parent
without making special written findings that the child and other parent can be adequately
protected from harm . . . .” Id. § 48-9-209(c).
51. Deborah Epstein & Lisa A. Goodman, Discounting Women: Doubting Domestic
Violence Survivors’ Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 399,
402 (2019) (describing how the #MeToo movement has spawned awareness).
52. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1531 (2000).
53. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L.
REV. 339, 370 (2000) (describing a possible expressive effect of anti-smoking ordinances);
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legal definition of domestic abuse can arm women and advocates with a new
tool in the custody toolbox, by allowing them to raise concerns that
previously might have been classified as typical relationship conflict.54
But as important a development as codifying coercive control may be,
merely changing the definition of abuse does not make the standard easy for
courts to apply. This difficulty is particularly true in child custody disputes,
in which the bedrock principle is considering the best interests of the child
but where courts continue to consider the parents’ interests in raising their
children.55 The Connecticut Coalition Against Domestic Violence stated
aspirationally in 2021: “By expanding the definition of family violence in
Connecticut’s restraining order statute to address coercive control, we’ll be
able to ensure court-ordered relief for the many non-physical tactics abusers
use to gain and maintain control over their victims.”56
While
well-intentioned, statements such as this one are unlikely to bear out as
anticipated, either with the issuance of more civil protective orders or with
more victims of coercive control winning custody of their children.57 Indeed,
even in jurisdictions where coercive control has been part of the definition of
domestic violence for some time, very few convictions have resulted.58

Maggie Wittlin, Buckling Under Pressure: An Empirical Test of the Expressive Effects of
Law, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 419, 422 (2011) (describing the expressive effect of law requiring
seatbelt use).
54. Erin Bajackson, Best Interests of the Child—a Legislative Journey Still in Motion, 25
J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 311, 336–37 (2013) (referring to “family squabbles”); L.M.F. v.
J.A.F., Jr., 24 A.3d 849, 856 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (referring to “domestic
contretemps”).
55. To prove domestic violence in family court, almost all states require a showing by a
preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-124(4) (West 2022);
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1)(a) (McKinney 2022). Nevada requires a showing by clear and
convincing evidence. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125C.0035(5) (West 2022). Because
Florida requires a conviction, its standard is ipso facto beyond a reasonable doubt. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 61.13(a) (West 2022).
56. Connecticut Coal. Against Domestic Violence, supra note 21.
57. See, e.g., Marie Solis, Do ‘Coercive Control’ Laws Really Help Abuse Victims?, THE
CUT (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.thecut.com/2021/02/coercive-control-laws-domesticabuse.html [https://perma.cc/947G-QAED] (describing how coercive control law may merely
“widen” the gaps in the system).
58. See, e.g., Marilyn McMahon & Paul McGorrery, Criminalising Emotional Abuse,
Intimidation and Economic Abuse in the Context of Family Violence: The Tasmanian
Experience, 35 UNIV. TAS. L. REV. 1, 11 (2016) (noting no convictions of emotional abuse
over the decade since the law was enacted unless the offense was accompanied by another
domestic violence offense and noting only eight convictions when an emotional abuse offense
was accompanied by another domestic violence offense); Review of the Controlling or
Coercive Behaviour Offence, U.K. HOME OFF. (May 10, 2021), https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/review-of-the-controlling-or-coercive-behaviour-offence/reviewof-the-controlling-or-coercive-behaviour-offence [https://perma.cc/ZM8B-HGV7] (stating
that statistics on the number of convictions for “controlling or coercive behaviour (CCB)”
alone were not available but that almost all convictions including CCB were accompanied by
convictions for other forms of domestic abuse).
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IV. FAMILY COURTS ARE UNDERFUNDED AND CONSTANTLY IN FLUX
The disconnect between amending the definition of domestic violence and
obtaining convictions for violations of the new laws may be attributed to a
number of factors. First, a neutral explanation may be that, to some
observers, what is and what is not domestic violence may seem difficult to
discern, and a pattern of coercive control may present to the resistant or
uneducated as typical relationship conflict.59 Because family court judges
do not necessarily have prior practice or judicial experience with domestic
violence or even family law issues,60 many are undereducated about
domestic violence in general and coercive control in particular. This
inexperience often derives from the fact that family courts are routinely
underfunded. As a result, appointments to the family court bench are
sometimes considered undesirable61 and education for family law judges is
underfunded and underavailable.62 Attorneys and litigants have expressed
dissatisfaction with temporarily assigned judges who tend to transfer to
another court as soon as they have developed some family law expertise.63
In other words, experience matters. As one court put it,
Custody cases occur at a time when battered women and children may be
most acutely vulnerable to the coercive controls and violent manipulations
of battering men. Unless the judiciary is carefully informed about the
impact of domestic violence on children and the abused parent, it will
inadvertently issue custody and visitation awards that further endanger the
abused parent and the children, themselves, who are at risk of both abuse
and severe emotional repercussions.64

59. See, e.g., Bajackson, supra note 54, at 336–37.
60. See N.Y.C. BAR, THE FAMILY COURT JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT AND ASSIGNMENT
PROCESS 5–6 (2020), https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.nycbar.org/files/2020790FamilyCourtJudicialAppointmentProcess.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3LZ-P92N] (“Another
negative impact on children, families and practitioners that lawyers consistently raised is when
a newly appointed or assigned jurist lacks sufficient expertise and experience in family law
and/or practice and/or the law and facts most relevant to the cases they must take over. One
institutional provider described the resulting delays in the ability to obtain timely interim relief
and the ultimate resolution of proceedings: ‘A judge’s lack of knowledge of relevant case
law, statutes, and family court practice results in unnecessary delays, as attorneys ask for
adjournments to brief issues, or run to the Appellate Division to seek a stay that will impact
the course of a case. Such delays are unfair to litigants and subject children, who want their
emotionally-challenging cases to end. In the child protective cases, this can also result in a
delay in the achievement of permanency for children.’” (emphasis omitted)).
61. See, e.g., FOSTERING RESULTS, CHILD. & FAM. RSCH. CTR., VIEW FROM THE BENCH:
OBSTACLES TO SAFETY & PERMANENCY FOR CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 5 (2004),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/
foster_care_reform/fosteringresults070104pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/FBZ8-GFDY].
62. See, e.g., id. at 4; Erika Burke, Family Court Judges’ Training, Background, and Child
Development Knowledge: Associations with Child Custody Decision Making 3–4 (May
2005) (B.A. thesis, University of Connecticut), https://opencommons.uconn.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=srhonors_theses [https://perma.cc/JD2H-CR6X].
63. See Burke, supra note 62, at 9.
64. T.J.H. v. S.N.F., 960 So. 2d 669, 675 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006) (Bryan, J., concurring)
(quoting Kent v. Green, 701 So. 2d 4, 7 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996)).
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V. EXPERT TESTIMONY IS CRITICAL TO PROVING COERCIVE CONTROL
BUT IS LARGELY UNAVAILABLE TO ABUSE VICTIMS
Second, “[e]xpert testimony can . . . dispel misconceptions about the
patterns of abuse and response . . . . [It] may also opine on the effect of abuse
on women . . . .”65 Because many judges may still be unfamiliar with the
effects of psychological abuse, virtually all recorded cases in which courts
have recognized and considered coercive control in custody determinations
included expert testimony on at least one side, if not both.66 The majority of
family law litigants are self-represented, however, due mostly to financial
reasons;67 they are therefore very unlikely to have the knowledge or
resources to hire experts to prepare and testify about coercive control.
Without expert evaluation and testimony, custody hearings become a game
of “he said, she said.”68 “Domestic violence is a nebulous concept that is
constantly evolving and can take many forms . . . .”69 Without expert

65. Linn v. State, 929 N.W.2d 717, 744 (Iowa 2019).
66. See, e.g., Irwin v. Shelby, 210 A.3d 705, 720 (Del. 2019) (stating that the lower court
“relied on [an expert’s] testimony and report that the mother was the victim of a pattern of
coercive control by the father and the court’s earlier finding of abuse” and that “[t]herefore,
the court’s finding of domestic abuse was supported by the record” when granting sole custody
of the children to the victim mother); J.S. v. G.I., No. CK16-03072, 2018 WL 4688906, at *6
(Del. Fam. Ct. Apr. 16, 2018) (stating that “[the] Court . . . found considerable support in the
testimony and report of [an expert] that Mother was the victim of a pattern of coercive control
by Father” and thereby granted custody of the young children to the mother, even though she
had engaged in two acts of situational abuse against the father); Jacquety v. Baptista,
No. 19-CV-9642, 2021 WL 1885263, at *37 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2021) (denying a father’s
motion to return his child to Morocco after relying on expert testimony that there was “‘clear
and compelling evidence’ that [the child] suffer[ed] from PTSD resulting from domestic
violence by [the father] toward [the mother]”). But see Engstrom v. McCarthy, 411 P.3d 653,
657 (Ariz. App. 2018) (“An expert’s characterization of what he or she believes constitutes
domestic violence is not . . . legally binding.”).
67. See STATE JUST. INST., CASES WITHOUT COUNSEL 12 (2016), https://iaals.du.edu/sites/
default/files/documents/publications/cases_without_counsel_research_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MGV7-RJD5] (finding that “90% of all study participants indicat[ed] that
financial issues were influential—if not determinative—in [the decision to self-represent]”);
L.M.F. v. J.A.F., Jr., 24 A.3d 849, 858 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (“We understand that
a great number of domestic violence cases are heard without the benefit of counsel guiding a
witness’s testimony in a manner consistent with the rules of evidence.”).
68. See Charlotte Barlow et al., Putting Coercive Control into Practice: Problems and
Possibilities, 60 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 160, 174 (2020) (“A recurring theme within coercive
control investigations was victim disclosures being considered as ‘weak’ or with
‘non-verifiable’ forms of evidence ultimately amounting to ‘one word against another.’”);
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility Discount, 166
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017) ( “In the paradigmatic case of ‘he said/she said,’ accuser and accused
offer two opposing versions of events: one party is telling the truth; the other is not. To pick
between competing accounts, the decider must judge credibility. Accusers—typically
women—do not tend to fare well in these contests.”); see also Don’t Confuse Domestic
Violence with “He-Said-She-Said,” STOP ABUSE CAMPAIGN, https://stopabusecampaign.org/
2021/01/07/he-said-she-said/ [https://perma.cc/ZEV3-PPCG] (last visited Apr. 2, 2022).
69. Engstrom v. McCarthy, 411 P.3d 653, 657–58 (Ariz. App. 2018).
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testimony, judges may be forced to adopt a Potter Stewart–esque perspective
of “I know it when I see it.”70
VI. JUDGES MAY DOUBT THAT ABUSE HAS OCCURRED OR THAT
COERCIVE CONTROL IS “REALLY ABUSE”
These two explanations for the discounting of female victims are
attributable, then, to reasons other than bias. But other explanations are more
sinister. As Professor Elizabeth Schneider describes, “Judges often do not
recognize or acknowledge abuse or tend to minimize it. . . . [J]udges do not
take claims of abuse seriously when they are presented, or even see them
when they are subtle, and so they do not factor abuse into custody
determinations.”71 Schneider goes on to explain that “[f]amily court judges
are often hostile and disbelieving towards claims of domestic violence”72 in
general, and so “there are critical problems in translating . . . broader
perspectives on abuse to lawyers, judges, and other professionals who still
tend to see a physical focus, minimize other aspects of abuse, and fail to see
the more subtle aspects of power and control as abusive and connected with
physical abuse.”73
If family court judges are often reluctant to deny custody to abusers whose
actions have led to injury,74 arrests,75 and convictions,76 it seems likely that
they will be even more reluctant to find that coercive control pervades a
relationship. Any adult who has been in a romantic relationship has
experienced some conflict; even a family court judge who believes in and
understands the harm of physical abuse may therefore have difficulty
understanding why coercive control is not merely normal relationship
conflict but a form of domestic violence.

70. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I shall not
today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be [obscenity]; and
perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it . . . .”).
71. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Domestic Violence Law Reform in the Twenty-First Century:
Looking Back and Looking Forward, 42 FAM. L.Q. 353, 360 (2008).
72. Id. at 359.
73. Id. at 356.
74. See, e.g., State ex rel. Thompson v. Spon, 700 N.E.2d 1281, 1282 (Ohio 1998)
(reviewing temporary grant of custody to a father, despite his conviction for domestic violence
after causing physical injuries to the mother).
75. See, e.g., Cox v. Cox, 613 N.W.2d 516, 521 (N.D. 2000) (holding that father’s arrest
and guilty plea to simple assault did not constitute a pattern of domestic violence).
76. See, e.g., Moore v. Moore, No. A-95-225, 1996 WL 45197, at *4 (Neb. Ct. App. Feb.
6, 1996) (affirming award of custody to father who had been convicted of assault three times
for violence against mother); Millard v. Clapper, 254 A.D.2d 640, 641 (N.Y. 1998) (denying
mother’s request for modification of custody order because father had been incarcerated for
domestic violence); Spon, 700 N.E.2d at 1282; A.H. v. R.M., 793 So. 2d 799, 800 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2001) (holding that a father’s conviction for assault was too remote in time to trigger a
statutory presumption against custody); Wentland v. Rousseau, 59 A.D.3d 821, 823 (N.Y.
2009) (awarding father custody even when father had been convicted of assaulting mother).
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VII. TO ENGENDER JUDGES’ BELIEF IN AND UNDERSTANDING OF
COERCIVE CONTROL, WE MUST EDUCATE ABOUT THE ROOT CAUSES OF
ABUSE AND UNDERSTAND THE COMPOSITION OF THE FAMILY COURT
SYSTEM
If we believe that judges minimize domestic violence and coercive control,
we cannot fix that problem without asking why it exists. One explanation
seems obvious: perhaps because men blame women for abuse that men
commit.77 Almost all perpetrators of coercive control are men, and the vast
majority of state court judges are also men.78 Add that to the fact that,
according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, only 12.5 percent of
full-time law enforcement officers are female,79 and the reason is clear: Men
are in control. Male police officers respond to calls from women alleging
coercive control.80 Male judges decide whether male perpetrators have
exerted too much control over women. Women, who over the course of
history have had to submit to men,81 must trust men who are accustomed to
holding relational and professional power over them to judge when that
power and control rise to the level of abuse.
But that trust is not a two-way street. For example, judges may discount
or disbelieve women who make domestic violence allegations. As one
scholar has described it, “some judges have viewed battered women as
untrustworthy, or as a group that exaggerates their claims in an effort to gain
custody.”82 Therefore, “[c]ourts’ discounting of battered women’s claims
that their children are at risk from the batterer is actually extraordinarily
common.”83 Although the majority of women’s reports of domestic violence

77. See, e.g., Nancy Berns, Degendering the Problem and Gendering the Blame: Political
Discourse on Women and Violence, 15 GENDER & SOC’Y 262, 269 (2001); Sharon Aneta
Bryant & Gale A. Spencer, University Students’ Attitudes About Attributing Blame in
Domestic Violence, 18 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 369, 374–75 (2003); Niwako Yamawaki et al.,
Perceptions of Domestic Violence: The Effects of Domestic Violence Myths, Victim’s
Relationship with Her Abuser, and the Decision to Return to Her Abuser, 27 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 3195, 3207–08 (2012).
78. See 2022 U.S. State Court Women Judges, NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN JUDGES,
https://www.nawj.org/statistics/2022-us-state-court-women-judges [https://perma.cc/FKA5H84M] (last visited Apr. 2, 2022) (demonstrating that only 36 percent of judges in state limited
and special jurisdiction courts are women and only 33 percent of judges in state general
jurisdiction courts are women).
79. See 2017 Crime in the United States Table 74: Full-Time Law Enforcement
Employees, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crimein-the-u.s.-2017/tables/table-74 [https://perma.cc/DEY8-UJG3] (last visited Apr. 2, 2022).
80. One recent study demonstrated that police were “demeaning” and “disrespectful”
when responding to domestic violence calls and that they frequently did not believe victims.
See ACLU, RESPONSES FROM THE FIELD: SEXUAL ASSAULT, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND
POLICING 12 (2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/2015.10.20_
report_-_responses_from_the_field_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9R2-CABR].
81. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Embracing Loving: Trait-Specific Marriage Laws
and Heightened Scrutiny, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1082 (2014).
82. Bajackson, supra note 54, at 336–37.
83. Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection:
Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 657, 672 (2003).
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are substantiated,84 women who raise psychological abuse concerns in child
custody cases are routinely disbelieved.85
And that gender dynamic extends to the family courtroom and the custody
matters that take place in it. Embedded in child custody disputes may be
attitudinal bias toward “a psychological rhetoric that reduces mothers’ [but
not fathers’] desires to have custody and control of their children to
pathology.”86 Women who seek sole or primary custody of their children are
often viewed as “having ‘issue overlay’ . . . [and] may be characterized as
clinging and overly dependent . . . [or] seen as greedy . . . [or as] vindictive
mothers who use the children to get back at their ex-husbands.”87 As the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court commented, “The very frequency of
domestic violence in disputes about child custody may have the effect of
inuring courts to it and thus minimizing its significance.”88 Therefore, as
Professors Deborah Epstein and Lisa Goodman note, “[S]urvivor-mothers
often leave family court having been wrongly denied custody of their
children . . . . A judicial willingness to discount their trustworthiness can
have repercussions that will last throughout their own lives and those of their
children.”89
Men who abuse can be good at hiding it. In social situations and in court,
they may be unusually charming and convincing90 (after all, that is how they
gaslight), putting women at even more of a disadvantage. In fact, female
abuse victims may be so beaten down by the abuse that they have a difficult

84. See Janet R. Johnston et al., Allegations and Substantiations of Abuse in
Custody-Disputing Families, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 283, 290–91 (2005) (discussing study that
found that 55 percent of domestic abuse allegations against fathers were substantiated and
noting that “there was no attempt to distinguish among ‘unsubstantiated’ allegations to
conclude which were clearly false and which could not be determined due to lack of
evidence”).
85. See, e.g., Epstein & Goodman, supra note 51, at 431 (“[M]others’ allegations of
domestic violence are discounted or even fully discredited by family court judges.”).
86. Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in
Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 766 (1988).
87. Id.; see also Joan S. Meier & Sean Dickson, Mapping Gender: Shedding Empirical
Light on Family Courts’ Treatment of Cases Involving Abuse and Alienation, 35 MINN. J.L. &
INEQUALITY 311, 317 (2017) (describing the reluctance to believe a woman who tries to protect
her children from the effects of domestic violence as “re-framing . . . [her] as a pathological
or vengeful liar who is severely ‘emotionally abusing’ her children by falsely teaching them
to hate and fear their father”).
88. Custody of Vaughn, 664 N.E.2d 434, 439–40 (Mass. 1996).
89. Epstein & Goodman, supra note 51, at 432.
90. See, e.g., Emmaline Campbell, How Domestic Violence Batterers Use Custody
Proceedings in Family Courts to Abuse Victims, and How Courts Can Put a Stop to It, 24
UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 41, 43 (2017) (“Batterers may present as ‘charming, charismatic,
likeable, reasonable, generous, and even flexible.’”); Ashley Milspaw & Hilary Vesell,
Co-Parenting vs. Parallel Parenting: Outcomes in Custody Cases with a History of Domestic
Violence, PA. LAW., Jan./Feb. 2017, at 32, 38; Lundy Bancroft, Understanding the Batterer in
Custody and Visitation Disputes, LUNDY BANCROFT (1998), https://lundybancroft.com/
articles/understanding-the-batterer-in-custody-and-visitation-disputes/
[https://perma.cc/
DUD7-KBRK] (“An abuser focuses on being charming and persuasive during a custody
dispute, with an effect that can be highly misleading to Guardians ad Litem, court mediators,
judges, police officers, therapists, family members, and friends.”).
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time effectively presenting their case in court, particularly when they are
self-represented91 or hesitant to raise the issue in custody hearings for several
reasons. As Professor Joan Meier has demonstrated, women who claim
abuse stand a significant chance of actually losing custody rather than
winning it.92 Furthermore, at least one study has shown that many women
fear that reporting abuse will lead to repeated and more severe violence and
so choose to stay silent,93 and those fears may well be grounded; many men
threaten to harm a woman who responds to violence by separating,94 and they
are very likely to carry out those threats.95
Why does this matter in the child custody context? Because the effects on
the children are paramount. Even family court judges who believe and
understand the effects of domestic violence on the immediate victim—the
91. See, e.g., State v. Hemenway, 216 A.3d 118, 133 (N.J. 2019) (noting that “[b]ecause
domestic violence victims are often unrepresented, under considerable stress, in fear of their
alleged abusers, and may have language barriers, courts must be patient and take the time
necessary to make a complete record”); see also Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff,
Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law,
21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 1059 (1993) (noting that an unrepresented “victim is terrified,
unclear of her legal rights, and highly susceptible to the batterer’s influence and control”);
Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 CONN. L. REV. 741,
800 n.321 (2015) (noting that unrepresented victims of abuse “are both unable to get their
evidence before the judge, and also unable to object to evidence improperly introduced by an
opponent”); Margaret F. Brinig, Loretta M. Frederick & Leslie M. Drozd, Perspectives on
Joint Custody Presumptions as Applied to Domestic Violence Cases, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 271,
277 (2014) (“Joint custody presumptions are particularly difficult for indigent and
self-represented victim-parents to overcome, even in cases involving substantial violence and
danger, because they can lack the resources to litigate and overcome such a presumption.”);
Merle H. Weiner, Domestic Violence and Custody: Importing the American Law Institute’s
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution into Oregon Law, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 643,
687 (1999) (“When a victim is represented, her attorney should call the court’s attention to
any domestic violence. However, in pro se proceedings, the information may never come to
the court’s attention because the victim may not understand its relevance.”).
92. See JOAN S. MEIER ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY OUTCOMES IN CASES INVOLVING PARENTAL
ALIENATION AND ABUSE ALLEGATIONS 26 (2019).
93. R.E. Fleury et al., “Why Don’t They Just Call the Cops?”: Reasons for Differential
Police Contact Among Women with Abusive Partners, 13 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 333 (1998).
94. See, e.g., Deborah Epstein, Margret E. Bell & Lisa A. Goodman, Transforming
Aggressive Prosecution Policies: Prioritizing Victims’ Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution
of Domestic Violence Cases, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 465, 476 (2003) (“Battered
women are most likely to be killed while taking steps to end the relationship with the abuser
or while seeking help from the legal system and at least 30% of all battered women who pursue
legal action are reassaulted during the process of prosecution.”); Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al.,
Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from a Multistate Case Control
Study, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1089, 1090 (2003) (“The risk of intimate partner femicide was
increased 9-fold by the combination of a highly controlling abuser and the couple’s separation
after living together . . . .”); Leslye Orloff, Lifesaving Welfare Safety Net Access for Battered
Immigrant Women and Children: Accomplishments and Next Steps, 7 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 597, 617 (2001) (“Women attempting to leave violent spouses are twice as likely
to become victims of homicide than abused women who continue to cohabitate with their
abusers.”).
95. See, e.g., Domestic Violence: Reasons Why Battered Victims Stay with the Batterers,
L.A. POLICE DEP’T, https://www.lapdonline.org/domestic-violence/domestic-violencereasons-why-battered-victims-stay-with-the-batterers/ [https://perma.cc/YZ7B-WJ5G] (last
visited Apr. 2, 2022).
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other parent—may not impute those effects to the children. This ignorance
means that, even when a court finds that domestic violence has occurred, it
may not matter in the custody analysis, particularly in jurisdictions where
domestic violence is only one factor to be considered.96
CONCLUSION
The law’s recognition of coercive control as a form of domestic violence
is an important step forward for the justice system and for victims who seek
custody of their children. Without extensive changes to the justice and family
court systems themselves, however, this development is unlikely to lead to
better outcomes for women who are engaged in custody battles against
coercive control perpetrators. In fact, by requiring women to raise allegations
of abuse and judges to believe and act on them—both difficult hurdles to
overcome—coercive control laws may effectively serve to place women and
their children in heightened danger from their abusers. While activists and
advocates for the victims of domestic violence should continue to fight for
changes in the law, they should also recognize the obstacles presented by the
current system and advise women accordingly.

96. Even in a rebuttable-presumption jurisdiction, some courts dismiss concerns. See, e.g.,
Thornton v. Ortiz Bosquez, No. A18-0223, 2018 WL 6442311, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 10,
2018) (“The [sentence in the custody statute] which sets forth the presumption against joint
custody in cases with a history of domestic abuse between the parties, does not state that the
presumption operates for or against any particular party. Rather, that provision simply states
that, if domestic abuse has occurred between the parties, there is ‘a rebuttable presumption
that joint legal custody or joint physical custody is not in the best interests of the child.’ The
presumption does not necessarily favor one party over the other party. The presumption
simply expresses a preference for sole custody in one parent or the other parent, unless the
presumption has been rebutted.” (citation omitted) (quoting MINN. STAT. § 518.17, subdiv.
1(b)(9) (2018))).

